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difficulty with tax avoidance is that the line between when tax avoidance is 
unacceptable and when it is acceptable is very subjective. Corporate tax avoidance 
is an issue that lately has raised into peoples’ concern after big corporations such 
as Apple’s, AstraZeneca’s and Google’s tax avoidance strategies came viral.  
 
Regulation corporate tax avoidance within the European Union is a very difficult 
task. The EU has limited competence in the field of direct taxation and it is up to 
the Member States themselves to regulate the field as long as it is compatible with 
EU legislation. For this reason, it is nearly impossible for the European Union to 
regulate tax avoidance being illegal.  
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corporations trying to avoid taxes very quickly which may in turn reduce the 
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1 Introduction  
 
Our rapidly globalizing world has led to a situation where corporations no longer 
are operating on a national level but they more commonly also operating on an 
international level. Corporate tax avoidance is a heavily debated question and 
has raised into peoples’ concern after big corporations such as Apple’s, 
AstraZeneca’s and Google’s tax avoidance strategies have come out to the 
media. This increased people’s awareness of how low tax rates some of the big 
multinational corporations have and people started to think why they should 
pay so high taxes while corporations so low. 
 
This can be seen by some as unfair market practices because bigger 
corporations have more funds to do aggressive tax planning and benefit from 
all tax reductions available as well as “going around” the system. There has 
been an increased use of tax havens where corporations keep their offshore 
accounts, for example in Bahamas, Cayman Island or Ireland. 
 
Defining tax avoidance is somewhat challenging since different countries 
defines it differently. In general however, three factors are usually present 
when it comes to tax avoidance. First the payment of taxes is lower than it 
reasonably should be when interpreting the legislation. Second the tax 
declaration is made in another country than the earnings originally originated 
from. Finally the taxes are not paid when they were earned (R. Palan, 2010, p. 
10). Tax avoidance may in general terms be described as a strategy of tax 
planning with the aim to lower taxes paid legally. It may be done by for 
example transfer pricing, tax planning and earnings management. It is the level 
of aggressiveness however that is the important factor to evaluate (Heitzman, 
2010, p. 137). Tax avoidance which is legal shall not however be mixed up with 
tax evasion which is a non-legal act. 
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Mr. M.A. Wisselink discussed in the book International Tax Avoidance in chapter 
VII concepts of international tax avoidance. He concludes that the borderline 
between these two is very uncertain. He discusses the fact that many times tax 
avoidance and tax evasion is mixed up and that legitimate tax avoidance where 
the main difference is that tax evasion is intentionally hiding or falsifying 
information from the authorities. Mr. Wisselink also discusses the fact that there 
are two normal rules for corporate residence the incorporation theory and the 
statutory seat theory, from which the latter is in more frequent use in the 
European Union and the former according to Mr. Wisselink gives more 
possibilities to tax avoidance since it is based on the fact that mere 
incorporation is the factor stating the tax liability. (Wisselink, 1979, pp. 191-
213) 
 
This Thesis will be a research on whether corporate tax avoidance among 
multinational enterprises within the EU should be criminalized or not. I will 
research what instruments corporations use to avoid taxes, whether the subject 
matter can be regulated on EU level or whether it is it a matter belonging to a 
corporation’s social responsibility. There has been several researches conducted 
on tax avoidance on a national level but not so much research has been done 
on an EU aspect.  
 
The research will be conducted by a deductive desk research. The thesis will 
mainly be based on EU regulations and directives as well as EU case law for the 
reason that the thesis focuses on the situation within the EU. 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that it would be beneficial to make tax 
avoidance illegal but in practical terms it would however not be economically 
worth it since regulating and monitoring this would be very difficult and costly. 
Furthermore, it would be very difficult to draw a consistent line between when 
it is tax avoidance and when it is not since this line is very fine, instead the 
author believes that it is to each and every company’s corporate social 
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responsibility to think soundly and not try to find the loop holes in the 
legislations.  
 
The chapter following this introduction will cover corporate social responsibility 
and its influence on corporate tax avoidance decisions. Then the author will 
discuss some of the most commonly used tax avoidance strategies among 
corporations. All strategies will not be covered since there are so many of them 
and it would be impossible to cover all in this thesis. The following two chapters 
will discuss the legal framework for EU to regulate over tax avoidance. They will 
also cover various measures taken by the EU including the new ant-tax 
avoidance directive 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 that will come into force by 
2019. The final two chapters will cover whether tax avoidance may in some 
occasions be illegal and whether tax avoidance should be regulated or not. 
  
  
 
4 
2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Corporate social responsibility linked to tax avoidance is a rather new concept 
and as mentioned in the introduction not so well covered by literature. 
Furthermore, often when literature covers tax avoidance and corporate social 
responsibility they bundle tax evasion and tax avoidance together even though 
the former is illegal and the latter legal (Panjay, 2015, p. 550). 
 
According to the Commission, corporate social responsibility can be defined in a 
nutshell as a voluntary practice corporations engage in to contribute to a better 
society by taking social and environmental concerns into account in their 
business practices (Commission, 2001, p. 4). This definition was further 
improved by the Commission in 2011 as being an action “over and above” a 
corporations legal obligations towards the society (Commission, 2011, p. 3). 
 
Traditionally the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
corporate taxes can according to Reuven Avi-Yonah, be divided into three 
categories depending on the view of the corporation.  
 
First the artificial entity view which holds that it can be held that taxes are a 
business cost and an issue between the corporation and the government and 
that it is a test of “corporate claims for social responsibility” (Avi-Yonah, 2004, 
pp. 1200-1201). Furthermore, it is a vital income for the government to collect 
taxes since without taxes the government will have difficulties in providing 
infrastructure and community services neither will it have assets to provide the 
corporations with services such as financial markets and legal oversight (Sikka, 
2010, pp. 134-136).  
 
Secondly the aggregate entity which holds that there is a relationship between 
the corporations and shareholders and that corporate tax is an indirect way to 
tax the shareholders. This theory argues that without corporate taxes the 
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shareholders could source their income through corporations and in that way 
avoid taxes.  
 
The final theory is the real entity which holds that the corporations are separate 
from the state as well as the shareholders (Avi-Yonah, 2004, pp. 1200-1210).  
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3 Corporate tax avoidance 
 
This chapter will cover the main types of corporate tax avoidance strategies 
used by multinational enterprise’s world-wide. It is important to grasp an 
understanding of these concepts to be able to understand the width of options 
corporations have available to use for avoiding their taxes. Understanding the 
complexity of the tax avoidance strategies also gives one an overview of how 
big issue corporate tax avoidance is. This chapter is solely dedicated to the tax 
avoidance strategies since it in the authors opinion describes very well what 
corporate tax avoidance is.  
 
The use of tax havens is probably one of the most well-known forms of 
corporate tax avoidance strategies. The problem with tax havens is that it has a 
very vague definition like the case with the definition of tax avoidance there is 
no official definition available. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development has for example list some characteristics of what a tax haven is 
and these include; low transparency and low or no taxes imposed at the 
corporations (Gravelle, 2010, pp. 3-4).  
 
3.1 Transfer pricing 
 
Transfer pricing is another example of a commonly used strategy in the field of 
tax avoidance. Transfer price is the price set for a transaction between divisions 
of a company. Multinational corporations often consist of several companies 
including for example braches, subsidiaries, agencies and/or permanent 
establishments which in turn are governed by the parent company. Transfer 
pricing becomes relevant when these companies enter transactions between 
each other or with the parent company itself. The transactions may include for 
example cross-border transfer of goods, intellectual property rights and/or or 
services. When the transactions take place, it is important to establish the 
correct transfer price between the related parties. It is then of particular 
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significance for the authorities to determine whether the companies involved in 
fact are related parties in order to establish whether transfer pricing rules 
apply. It is up to the State in question to assess whether the parties are related. 
The reason for the importance of this assessment is the arm’s length principle is 
applied by the national authorities on transactions between related parties 
(Issues, 2011, pp. 1-2). Transfer pricing itself is legal, however it is a method 
that allows, particularly the MNEs to avoid a significant amount of taxes from 
being paid to certain states and becomes illegal when it does not comply with 
the arm’s length principle (Osbourne, 2011, pp. 814-815).  
 
In the context of EU law the EU has made proposals and taken actions solely 
devoted to transfer pricing, such as establishing the Transfer Pricing Forum and 
the Transfer Pricing and the Arbitration Convention (Helminen, 2011, pp. 237-
240). 
 
3.2 Thin capitalization 
 
Companies are financed by equity and usually also with some debt. Companies 
are thinly capitalized when the amount of debt in relation to equity funding is 
high. Multinational enterprises utilize thin capitalization on a regular basis due 
to the deductions of paid interests from the taxable income they receive. In 
general the interests on debt are deductible from the taxable income on a 
corporate level. To encounter thin capitalization many countries around the 
world have adapted thin capitalization rules (Blouin, 2014, p. 2).  
 
Many countries in the European Union have adapted thin capitalization rules. In 
the Commissions Working Paper on thin capitalization rules, there are several 
key dimensions in the differences between. According to the authors of the 
paper the first key difference of is the rules that define the maximum debt 
ratio, under which the interest remains deductible in the country of payment. 
These rules so forth fall into two different categories: rules restricting total debt 
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and rules limiting debt from related parties i.e. companies which are part of the 
same MNE. Second, the rules on thin capitalization can differ in the treatment 
of interest on debt that is deemed to be excessive, e.g. denial of deductibility of 
interest or certain unfavorable tax consequences. The third key difference 
according to the authors, can be found from the level of enforcement in each 
individual state, which could vary significantly (Blouin, 2014, pp. 2-5). 
 
3.3 Treaty Shopping 
 
Treaty shopping is a practice used by multinational enterprises to minimize the 
tax needed to be paid. Apple is one example of a multinational enterprise that 
has utilized treaty shopping (Commission, 2013). The OECD in their Final 
Report Action 6 describes treaty abuse, and in particular treaty shopping as one 
of the most important concerns regarding Base Erosion and Profit Shifting for 
the reason that the practice taxpayers are engaged in claims benefits that were 
not intended to be granted (OECD, 2015, p. 9). Tax treaties may be utilized in 
several different ways. Treaty shopping may be used to refer to arrangements 
that are completely artificial in nature used for avoiding taxes (Panayi, 2010, p. 
23).  
 
By choosing the countries with most suitable tax treaties and establishing 
conduit companies in these states, taxpayer can avoid source taxation, and in 
some cases, even rely on conflicts that ultimately lead to zero taxation 
(Helminen, 2013, p. 558). Companies can rely on the different treatment of 
certain revenues under tax treaties which may lead to conflicts of qualification, 
where the residence state’s internal legislation categorizes certain income as 
such that the source state has the exclusive right to tax, but the source state in 
turn categorizes that particular income as something that it does not have the 
right to tax under the relevant tax treaty (Jones, 2003, pp. 184-186).  
 
  
 
9 
In the context of the EU under the previous Parent Subsidiary Directive 
2011/96/EU, taxpayers were able to set up companies in Member States for the 
sole purpose of receiving tax exempt dividends from third countries (Helminen, 
2013, p. 599).  
 
3.4 Controlled foreign companies 
 
Controlled foreign Corporations are corporations that can be used to minimize 
taxation. A controlled foreign corporation is a corporate entity conducting 
business in a different jurisdiction where the controlling owners reside.  
 
To benefit the most of controlled foreign corporations, companies tend to locate 
them in countries where profit shifting and the taxation is the most favorable. 
Utilizing controlled foreign corporations may deprive the country of residence of 
the transferring company from taxes that otherwise would have been payable 
there.  
 
This is only to mention a few of the possibilities companies have available for 
avoiding taxes. In the following chapters I will cover some more tax avoidance 
strategies especially related to the European Union. 
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4 THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FIELD OF DIRECT TAXATION 
 
This chapter will cover the main steps the European Union has taken towards 
preventing tax avoidance from. The chapter will cover both the basis for the 
competences of the EU in the field of tax avoidance as well as the actions 
already taken by the EU. 
 
4.1 Union Competences in the Field of Direct Taxation 
 
To assess the Union’s capabilities to encounter tax avoidance one must first 
have a general understanding of what competences the EU possesses. Direct 
taxation is under Member States discretion and has not therefore been covered 
by the EU treaties (Panjay, 2013, p. 3), yet the European Union has heavily 
influenced the field of direct taxation in the Member States. Even though 
Member States are free to regulate direct taxes as long as they comply with EU 
legislation according to Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
 
The legal basis for the European Union to legislate taxation matters can be 
found in Articles 110-113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, for purposes of indirect taxation and in Articles 114-118 of the same 
Treaty for matters with an indirect on the internal market (Paternoster, 2016). 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not define nor 
address direct taxation as a term in a deeper context and the competence in 
the field of direct taxation is therefore derived from power to legislate over 
issues affecting the internal market.  
 
Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union states that EU Member States shall 
ensure that the objectives set out by the Union are followed as well as take any 
necessary steps to ensure that this is reached. Article 4 is especially significant 
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in terms of direct taxes for the reason, that the Member State are free to 
regulate in the area. Almost all practice has emerged from case law stating 
from the Daily Mail case.  
 
Even though the harmonization of direct taxes has been exercised only to a 
limited extent there is a possibility for introducing new harmonization directives 
provided by Articles 115, 116 and 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. According to, these Articles this is possible when three criteria 
are met namely; the internal markets proper function is limited by the national 
legislations; the desired objectives cannot be reach by Member State action and 
if there is a need for new EU legislation to overcome the problem. Furthermore, 
under Articles 20 TEU and 326-334 TFEU covering the enhanced cooperation 
may be applied in the field of direct tax. These Articles allows for EU legislation 
to be introduced and imposed on only a certain group of Member State, i.e. not 
necessarily all Member States need to be involved (Cerioni, 2015, p. 22). The 
Union has so far successfully adopted legislation under 115 TFEU a few times, 
for instance, the Interest Royalty Directive (Union, 2003) and Parent Subsidiary 
Directive (Council Directive (EU) 2015/121) as well as the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive during summer 2016.  
 
4.1.1 Invoking State Aid Rules to Tackle Certain Arrangements 
 
The state aid rules are something that impose certain restrictions over Member 
States in relation to tax matters, since certain exemptions and lowered rates 
can amount to unlawful state aid. The state aid rules can be invoked in order to 
combat against certain arrangements otherwise unbeatable. The case arises 
where a given Member State makes a selective refund or a tax or if it 
deliberately uses the money to support certain company or group of companies. 
In accordance with the state aid rules laid down in Articles 107 to 109 in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, if the revenue borne from tax 
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inflows goes from internal revenue services to support a certain domestic 
industry, the practice could be challenged as illegal state aid under the afore 
mentioned Articles (P. Craig, 2015, p. 661). 
In August 2016, the Commission published their decision on landmark case 
against Apple, concerning unlawful state aid from the Republic of Ireland. The 
subject matter of this case concerned unlawful benefits granted to Apple, which 
were due to certain arrangements between Ireland and Apple. According to the 
Commission, certain decisions of the Irish authorities had allowed Apple to 
operate under corporate tax rate of 1%-0.005% between the years 2003 and 
2014. Apple had however enjoyed a significantly lower tax rate since 1991 
(Commission IP/16/2923). 
Situations where actions of individual states in the field of taxation may 
constitute illegal state aid are not only limited to undue tax benefits granted by 
states to companies, but encompass more complex situations such as bilateral 
advance pricing arrangements between states. The advanced pricing 
arrangements allow companies for coordination with the national tax authorities 
prior to the transfer taking place in order to assess the compatibility of the 
transaction with the arm’s length principle. The point where the advanced 
pricing arrangements become relevant in terms of state aid rules is where they 
do not align with the market conditions. The Commission has stated that where 
the advanced pricing arrangements between countries and companies follows 
the guidelines of the OECD, which provide for five different assessment 
methods of a correct price (OECD, 2010), and also the guidelines which provide 
for the appropriateness of use of certain method, that arrangement is not likely 
to give rise to illegal state aid proceedings (DG, 2016, pp. 4-5 ). 
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4.1.2 Administrative Cooperation and the Information Exchange Directive 
 
Administrative cooperation in the field of taxation has been a long term project 
and is one of the most effective ways to counter tax avoidance as a general 
issue at EU level. The action plan of 2012 has provisions in relation to 
cooperation between jurisdiction to equip the Member States better to combat 
harmful practices with regard to value added tax fraud and business taxation 
(Remeur, 2015, p. 21).  
 
Since direct taxation is not harmonized across the Union makes it easier for 
taxpayers avoid them in the country of residence by several different 
instruments. The instruments on cooperation between jurisdictions are intended 
to create trust by providing everyone with the same rights, rules and 
obligations (Commission, 2017). The tax authorities of individual Member States 
therefore must cooperate in the sense of information exchange to combat the 
abusive practices conducted by the tax payers. The Council Directive 
2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of 
taxation was an attempt to make this easier for the Member States. The 
Directive lays down the framework for organizing the information exchange 
between the Member States. The Directive speaks for automatic information 
exchange between the tax jurisdictions in the EU. The administrative 
cooperation between Member States was improved by the 2014 and 2015 
amendments to the Directive (Camille Allain, 2016, p. 10). The Directive was 
created by the rights derived from Articles 113 and 115 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and aimed at making the information 
exchange more efficient among the Member States (Union, 2011). 
 
According to the legislators the Directive is based on the achievements of 
Directive 77/799/EEC but is intended to provide for more clear and precise rules 
governing administrative cooperation between Member States. The Directive 
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therefore is intended to widen the scope of administrative cooperation between 
Member States with regard to exchange of information (Union, 2011). 
 
The Directive includes three types of information exchange: automatic, 
spontaneous, and on request. The inherent intention of these is to assist 
individual Member States to become aware of often highly complex tax evasion 
schemes conducted either by corporations, or even natural persons. One of the 
reasons for the Directive for being of significant importance has to do with the 
fact that it places obligations on States, similarly like harmonization would do, 
even though if the state is one of which could arguably be actively entering into 
tax competition with the intention to attract foreign investments. Thus, the 
challenges relating to the competences and issues relating to reluctant 
individual Member States are overcome by this Directive. Today the 
Commission has also adopted an implementing regulation that provides for 
standard forms that have the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of exchange of information. 
 
The 2014 amendment has to do with extending the cooperation between tax 
authorities in Member States in cases of financial account information 
(Commission, 2017). This according to the Commission in the explanatory part, 
was due to the increased number of opportunities to invest abroad, with a wide 
range of financial products, which so on diluted the effectiveness of previous 
Union instruments adapted to combat tax related issues (Council 
Directive2014/107/EU, 2014). The Directive goes further in requiring Member 
States to take actions in relation to financial institutions and their reporting. The 
Member States under the amendment to Article 8 are now required inter alia to 
enact legislation requiring financial institutions to enhance the reporting of 
financial accounts and to perform due diligence in a more effective manner set 
out in the Annexes I and II of the directive (Directive 2014/107/EU). 
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The 2015 amendment (Directive 2015/2376) in turn revolves around cross-
border tax rulings and APAs. The Commission while adapting the new directive, 
acknowledged that in certain cases APAs had led to a low level of taxation of 
artificially large amounts of capital in the state that had given the advance 
ruling, and therefore it urgently sought increased transparency relating to the 
matter. (explanatory part) (Directive (EU) 2015/2376). The amendment to the 
Directive requires relevant authorities of the Member States where the cross-
border ruling or APA is issued, amended or renewed, to communicate details of 
the cross-border ruling or APA, by automatic exchange of information to other 
Member States and the Commission (Directive 2015/2376, art. 8a). This 
requirement obviously has great potential in combating tax competition within 
the Union due to increased transparency. This also relates to previously 
mentioned issue of illegal state aid in context of APAs and does, at least on 
paper, seem like a deterrent against such conduct. 
 
4.1.3 The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
 
As we will see in the following chapter on the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the 
Union is relatively strongly attempting to legislate over corporate taxation by 
instruments such as establishing minimum rules on certain kinds of conduct 
such as exit taxation, CFCs and abusive conduct. Nevertheless, the probably the 
most ambitious and potentially the most controversial attempt is the common 
consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) which would create a single set of 
rules that would allow the profits to be allocated between the relevant Member 
States properly. The CCCTB has been under scrutiny before, with the latest 
attempt being in 2011 (COM (2015) 302 final, p. 7). Now however, in order for 
the process to be more ‘manageable’, the CCCTB will be a two-stage process, 
first stage being the adoption of the common base, which unlocks all the key 
benefits to companies operating within the union, and the second phase being 
the more challenging consolidation (Commission IP/16/3471, 2016). The main 
difference to the previous proposal in 2011 is the in the scope of application. 
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The most recent proposal, unlike the previous one, would be mandatory for 
companies of certain size e.g. most multinational enterprises. The current 
proposal also emphasizes the importance of leaving the application of the 
CCCTB optional to companies that do not meet the criteria for mandatory 
application (COM (2016) 683 final). 
 
The Commission squeezes the CCCTB under competence provided by Article 
115 TFEU (COM (2016) 683 final) by relying on elimination of distortion of the 
internal market. This is made possible by the mismatches i.e. differences in 
classification of corporate entities or transactions. The Commission in their 
explanatory memorandum explains that mismatches can create risks of double 
taxation or non-taxation, which thereby distort the functioning of the internal 
market (COM (2016) 685 final). 
 
The CCCTB proposal does not contain provision stipulating corporate tax rates 
per se, but merely seeks to enhance the transparency in the calculation of 
taxable amounts and allocate these amounts between relevant states (COM 
(2016) 685 final). The CCCTB has several aims, and the tackling of tax 
avoidance is merely one of these goals. In addition to the latter goal, the 
CCCTB aims to improve the single market for businesses by reducing 
compliance costs, resolve complex double taxation disputes, and also address 
mismatches between Member States like the ATAD (discussed in the next 
chapter) does (Commission IP/16/3471, 2016). 
 
As regards tax avoidance, the CCCTB addresses avoidance in a few ways. The 
first of these is the issues borne from transfer pricing. Garbarino in his article 
relating to corporate taxation within the Union level points out the connection 
between profit shifting via TP and the nature of the CCCTB; if there is multi-
country consolidation in corporate taxation, aggressive TP is neutralized since 
there is no need to shift profits between high and low tax jurisdictions 
(Garbarino, 2016, p. 290). This of course could only be reached at the point 
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where the second ‘consolidation’ part of the proposal was adopted. The second 
tax avoiding technique that has also been discussed in this paper that the 
proposal addresses is thin capitalization. The Commission, as pointed out by 
Ryding and Ravenscroft, now recognizes that the current tax systems can 
incentivize financing a company’s operations with debt rather than equity 
(Ryding, Ravenscroft, 2016). The proposal for the common base addresses the 
issue in a similar manner by interest limitation rules like the ATAB but leaves 
rooms for research and development incentives under the ‘allowance for growth 
and investment rules’ (AGI) (COM (2016) 685 final). The effectiveness of this 
measure is however questioned by Ryding and Ravenscroft, as they fear that it 
will in allow corporations to make deductions for expenses that they in reality 
haven’t had (Ryding, Ravendcroft, 2016). 
 
Garbarino also points out that the common consolidated tax base would obviate 
cases such as the one that occurred with Apple, where a multinational based in 
third country obtaining undue tax benefits from an individual Member State, 
would instead have to deal with single EU system (Garbarino, 2016, p. 289). 
However, such companies would also benefit from such a system by reduced 
compliance costs, since the taxes of the whole company’s operations within the 
Union under the proposal the company would declare its taxes in a single 
Member State, after which the tax authorities would communicate and allocate 
the taxable profits (COM (2016) 302 final, p. 7). The complexities in operations 
of cross-border companies would therefore significantly decrease where the 
companies would have to follow only a single set of rules. In addition to this, 
the consolidating part of the proposal would offer groups to be able to offset 
losses occurred in one Member State against profits generated in another 
(Garbarino, 2016, p. 289). 
 
Another notion pointed out by Garbarino is the impact of the CCCTB on harmful 
tax competition between Member States (Garbarino, 2016, p. 286). Obviously, 
even though the tax rates within individual Member States would remain as an 
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internal matter the increased transparency along with higher level of 
cooperation has high potential in context of reducing harmful tax competition. 
 
The effectiveness of the proposal remains to be seen. In the current setup, a 
likely outcome is the adoption of the common base. However, the Commission 
acknowledges the controversial nature of the consolidation. Thus, the proposal 
for consolidation might have some rough terrain ahead due to the unanimity 
requirement. If the CCCTB is to fail in its current form as the proposed 
directives, Article 20 TEU provides for enhanced cooperation, under which 
minimum of nine Member States can enter into ‘deeper’ cooperation and adapt 
legislation such as CCCTB (Garbarino, 2016, p. 290). This is a genuine 
opportunity in case either of the proposals are vetoed by some Member States 
(Chen, 2015). 
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5 EU Measures  
 
Having explained the general instruments utilized by MNEs and creating an 
understanding of the arrangements which companies may engage in, the 
following chapters will discuss the arrangements that occur in the EU level.  
 
It is important to note that for the purposes of this chapter, there are 
arrangements that occur in relation to the EU may vary in their nature. 
Garbarino discussed in his article on harmonization of corporate tax law in the 
Union different categories of EU policies in corporate tax matters. Gabriano 
categorizes them into three dimension; intra-EU policies, EU-inbound and EU-
outbound. Intra-EU policies are related to intra-State mobility of persons and 
capital among the Member States. EU-inbound refers to the policies of the EU. 
Finally, EU-outbound refers to policies of the EU as a whole, in respect to EU 
investors and operating outside of the EU (Garbarino, 2016, p. 277). 
 
5.1 Case Law by the Court of Justice if the European Union 
 
In the Centros case ( Centros v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999), a 
Danish couple established a limited liability company into the United Kingdom 
with the purpose of circumventing the Danish requirement of minimum capital. 
There was no intent to conduct any economic activities in the UK and when the 
company applied for registering a branch in Denmark they where refused on 
the grounds that the required share capital had not been paid by Centros ( 
Centros v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999, para. 23). 
 
The case was referred to the European Court of Justice as a request for a 
preliminary ruling. The Court was to examine whether the Danish authorities’ 
decision to reject the application on the basis that no economic activities were 
conducted in the UK parent and that the branch was set up purely for rule 
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circumventing purposes, was in line with the limits laid down in Articles 52 and 
58. 
 
The Court stressed out in their judgement that if a national of a Member State 
wish to set up a company, and chooses to establish the company in another 
Member State where the rules of company law are more relaxed and later sets 
up branches for that company in other Member States, does not constitute an 
abuse of the right of establishment ( Centros v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
1999, para. 27). This conduct after all, is inherent for the freedom of 
establishment and the single market enshrined by the Treaty itself.  
 
The Court concluded that the Member States were not authorized to impose 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment on the basis of protection of 
creditors for the sake of preventing fraud in case there are other ways to 
ensure this protection ( Centros v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999, para. 
30). 
 
The Centros ruling was re-affirmed in the Inspire Art case (Kamer van 
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, 2003), which had 
similar characteristics as the Centros case where the Dutch law was 
circumvented by having a company established in the UK with a branch in the 
Netherlands (Barnard, 2013, p. 339). The Court ruled that rules imposed by the 
Netherlands had the effect of unjustifiably limiting the freedom of establishment 
(Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, 2003, 
p. 101), and again that the fact that the UK established company carried out its 
activities solely in the Netherlands through its branch did not constitute and 
abuse of the freedom of establishment (Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken 
voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, 2003, paras. 105). 
 
In the Daily Mail case (The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc, 1988), an 
  
 
21 
investment company incorporated in London under English laws, attempted to 
avoid significant taxes otherwise payable to the UK in a transaction concerning 
the sale of assets. The arrangement was to transfer the central management to 
the Netherlands prior to the transaction taking place. Daily mail however, 
wanted to maintain its legal personality and status as a UK company (Barnard, 
2013, p. 328). 
 
The approach adapted by the court in Daily Mail was more restrictive in nature, 
and a line was drawn between acceptable and unacceptable reliance on the 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. The Court did already at this point identify 
the points on the freedom of establishment, which were later confirmed in 
Centros and Inspire Art by stating that the companies do have the right to 
establish branches and even separate legal entities such as subsidiaries in other 
Member States (The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc, 1988, pp. paras 16-17). 
This according to the Court nevertheless, is completely different from a scenario 
where a company seeks to transfer its central management, control and 
administration to another state while retaining its status as a company 
incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom. The Court concluded that 
such arrangements fall outside the scope of the Articles 52 and 58. Therefore, 
these articles at the time did not confer a right to a company to transfer the 
central management and control from a state of incorporation where it has its 
registered office (The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc, 1988, para. 25). 
 
This judgment was very important since it set certain limits for arrangements 
created for solely tax planning purposes. The Court did not expressly state that 
departing from one state to another, and therefore becoming a non-tax 
resident in the state of origin constituted an abuse. The Court however clearly 
laid down that the Treaties did not grant such a right for companies and that 
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Member States may legislate to reduce such practices. Such practices are 
harmful for the states where the company would otherwise be liable to pay tax. 
 
One of the most significant Union cases relating to tax planning is the Cadbury 
Schweppes case (Cadbury’s Schweppes, 2005). The case concerned UK’s 
controlled foreign companies rules laid down to prevent companies from setting 
up subsidiaries in states where the taxation was more favorable. The general 
idea was that UK parent companies were not subject to controlled foreign 
companies rules, where they would have been taxed on non-resident 
subsidiaries’ profits(Barnard, 2013, p. 353). 
 
In the Cadbury case a UK parent company sought to establish two subsidiaries 
to Ireland. The purpose of the subsidiaries was to benefit from the Irish tax and 
as a result avoid higher taxes that they would otherwise have been subject to 
in the UK (Cadbury’s Schweppes, 2005, paras. 17-18). The UK’s Controlled 
Foreign Company rules were triggered when profits of the UK parent’s non-
resident subsidiaries were subject to lower taxation (Cadbury’s Schweppes v. 
Commissioners of the Inland Revenue, 2005, pp. 14, 19). Cadbury objected 
claiming that the tax authorities infringed the freedoms guaranteed by the 
current European Communities Treaty Articles 43, 49 and 56 EC. The case was 
referred to the Court of Justice regarding whether the legislation enacted by the 
UK concerning controlled foreign companies was contrary to the fundamental 
freedoms (Cadbury’s Schweppes, 2005, para. 24). Even though the Court had 
rule in Centros and Inspire Art on similar matters concerning freedom of 
establishment, the rules concerning tax-avoidance schemes had not been dealt 
with very thoroughly.  
 
The court ruled once again that the Controlled Foreign Company rules where 
contrary to the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Articles 43 and 49 of 
the European Communities Treaty (Cadbury’s Schweppes, 2005, para. 46).  
 
  
 
23 
The second question referred had to do with the conduct of Cadbury 
Schweppes. The national court asked whether establishing and capitalizing 
companies in another Member State solely to take advantage of a tax regime 
that was more favorable than the one in the primary state of establishment, 
consisted an abuse of the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (Cadbury’s 
Schweppes, 2005, para. 23). 
 
The Court took a clear standing in relation to this question, continuing in the 
same direction as they had taken in the Centros and Inspire Art cases. The 
Court ruled that the fact that the company was established in another Member 
State to benefit from a more favorable tax regime did not itself constitute an 
abuse of the freedoms (Cadbury’s Schweppes v. Commissioners of the Inland 
Revenue, 2005, p. 37). The court laid down a specific formula, that could be 
used to assess the legality of such arrangements. Restrictions such as the 
Controlled Foreign Company rules in the UK could be justified for preventing 
abusive practices. The objective of the rules therefore must be the restriction of 
conduct involving the creation of that it must be a wholly artificial arrangement 
(Barnard, 2013, p. 354; Barnard, 2013). The Court continued to refer to 
previous case law stating that to detect an artificial arrangement there must be 
a subjective element of intention to obtain the tax advantage as well as 
objective circumstances showing that the was not achieved (Cadbury’s 
Schweppes, 2005, para. 64).  
 
The case was important in terms of tax avoidance and freedoms guaranteed by 
the treaties by drawing a distinction between arrangements that are justified 
and the wholly artificial arrangements.  
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5.2 The Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich 
 
The double Irish with a Dutch sandwich is one of the more well-known 
arrangement used by multinational corporations in the European Union. It 
allows the multinationals to operate in the Union with extremely favorable tax 
rates, for example Apple that operated in Ireland with tax rates as low as 2.2% 
(Falben, 2016, p. 273). The double Irish with a Dutch sandwich can be thought 
of as a hybrid of treaty shopping and transfer pricing.  
 
Zucman in his article about the Dutch sandwich describes the arrangement in 
the light of Google US, and its subsidiaries in the EU (Zucman, 2014, pp. 121-
148). The whole arrangement starts with the US parent transferring part of its 
intangible capital to H1 in Ireland. This holding company is a tax resident in 
Bermuda, since the Irish laws allow this if the company is managed from 
another state. Next, H1 creates another Irish subsidiary (here the C2) who also 
is granted the license. In turn C2 grants it a license forward to all affiliates 
within the EU, allowing them to use them in their respective territories, while 
these rights initially belong to the US parent. Then all the other companies 
within the EU pay royalties to C2 from the revenue that was generated by the 
use of these rights (Zucman, 2014, pp. 124-125). 
 
This is followed by the arrangement under which the majority of profits seemed 
to occur in Bermuda, where there is no corporate income tax (CIT). C2 
however, cannot transfer the capital to H1 directly via royalties, as the royalties 
would be subject to Irish withholding tax since leaving the tax jurisdiction 
(Zucman, 2014, p. 125). To circumvent this rule, the Dutch shell company S3 
comes into play as a detour.  
 
Since both C2 and S3 are within the European Union, the royalty payments 
between these entities are tax-free (Zucman, 2014, p. 126). This advantage is 
used and the C2 will transfer royalties to S3. In turn, the magic happens at the 
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point where S3 pays royalties back to H1. For the Dutch authorities under their 
relevant legislation and double tax treaties (DTTs), the Irish/Bermudian hybrid 
is Irish, and the same rules of tax-free royalties between these two countries 
are taken an advantage of (Zucman, 2014, p. 125), even though the royalties in 
reality end up under Bermudian tax jurisdiction with the zero CIT. 
 
5.3 Race to the Bottom 
 
After researching on the issue, it seems that race to the bottom is not a Union 
wide issue in regard of national taxation policies. In general terms race to the 
bottom occurs on an international level when two or more countries start 
competing to get for example direct investments trough deregulation. When it 
comes to taxation country A may narrow down its tax base. 
 
As mentioned at Union level it is not a big issue yet, however, when it comes to 
the establishment of corporations some general principles of investor 
protections, such as minimum capital requirements have been abandoned in 
some countries with the intention to attract corporations. One example is the 
Centros case where the minimum capital requirements for establishing a limited 
liability company under United Kingdom corporate law was significantly higher 
than in the Danish rules on minimum capital requirements. Even though the 
case itself did not concern taxation the idea behind it is the same. 
 
During the end of the summer in 2016 due to the result of ‘Brexit’ vote, plans 
on cutting corporate tax rates in the UK arose. This raised concerns of possible 
race to the bottom (Schwanke, 2016). In case this would happen one way to 
counter it at Union level could be the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB). The Commission re-launched the CCCTB in October 2016 with 
the objective of making corporate taxation in the EU more fair, competitive and 
more growth-friendly. The CCCTB had been proposed in 2011, but it proved to 
be too controversial for the Member States to agree in one go. If such races to 
  
 
26 
the bottom were to happen, they could also pave the way for Union wide 
regulation such as CCCTB (Commission, 2016). 
 
5.4 The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
 
In 2016 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 was passed concerning tax avoidance 
and rules against it. This was a very interesting addition in the field of exit taxes 
since it covered exit taxes thoroughly and created a unanimous understanding 
of what is meant by exit taxes in the EU. The Directive clarified that assets 
transferred between the parent company and its subsidiaries falls outside the 
scope of exit taxes. It furthermore clarifies the way exit taxes shall be 
computed namely by creating a market value and giving the receiving state the 
possibility to dispute the value set by the exit State if it does not reflect the real 
market value (Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance 
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 2016). The 
Directive covers, interest limitation rules, exit taxes, general anti-abuse rules, 
hybrid mismatches and controlled foreign companies. The latter I will however 
not cover since it has already been covered earlier in the thesis. The directive is 
based on Article 115 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
The Directive legislates strongly current issues in the field of tax avoidance in 
the European Union (Navarro, 2016, p. 117). 
 
5.4.1 Interest limitation rule 
 
Interest limitation rules are covered by Article 4 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive (Os, 2016, p. 190). The main concern of the provision is to limit the 
deductibility of interests. According to the preparatory work such limitations are 
necessary due to increased engagement of corporations in excessive interest 
payments (Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices 
that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 2016). Such interests 
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commonly occur in thin capitalization schemes (Helminen, 2013, pp. 304-305). 
The ultimate purpose of this provision is to therefore mitigate the difference on 
tax treatment of the debt which as an instrument generates deductible 
payments, and equity that is generally non-deductible with regard to the 
payments (Navarro, 2016, p. 118). 
 
Since interest payments are generally tax deductible in the EU, the Commission 
sought it necessary to adapt interest limitation rules. The interest limitation 
under the directive establishes a threshold for deductibility of interests that 
exceed 30% tax payer’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) (Navarro, 2016, p. 118). Alternatively, the tax payer may 
be allowed to deduct interests below 3 million € limit, which is to be considered 
for the entire group (Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance 
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 2016, p. Art. 
4). As discussed previously, this limit of 3 million € however is proposed to be 
raised to 5 million € by the consolidating CCCTB proposal (COM(2016) 683 
final). 
The interest limitation rule has received its fair share of criticism. Van Os in his 
article assessing the interest limitation rule in the Directive describes the rule as 
a safeguard measure to protect tax revenue rather than anti-avoidance rule 
(Os, 2016, p. 190). The reason why this could be problematic is that where the 
aim of the directive is to ‘combat tax avoidance’, the interest limitation rule 
limits the tax deductibility of arm’s length interest expenses. The ECJ however, 
is that tax deductibility of arm’s length interest expenses, do not by themselves 
constitute tax avoidance, which according to van Os, could be problematic from 
the point of proportionality principle (Os, 2016, p. 198). 
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5.4.2 Exit Taxation 
 
Exit taxation essentially comes down to the state of departure taxing the EU 
taxpayer when the taxpayer moves residence or assets from one jurisdiction to 
another. This is due to unrealized gains that could otherwise be completely tax 
exempt in the state of departure. According to the preparatory work of the 
ATAD it is imperative that the cases in which taxpayers are subject to exit tax 
rules and in fact taxed on unrealized capital gains which have accumulated in 
their transferred assets (Directive 2016/1164). To elaborate on this one may 
imagine there is an IT company established in state A, since state A offers an 
ideal environment for an IT startup to operate during its first operational year. 
However, the CIT in state A is relatively high, and the company decides to 
move its unrealized assets to a PE in another Member State or transfer its tax 
residence to state B with significantly favorable tax regime, even though the 
economic value of the capital gains were created in the territory of state A but 
had not realized at the time of the exit. 
 
Navarro, Parada and Schwarz categorize three different situations, where the 
Member State should in accordance with the Directive, impose an exit tax on 
the difference of book and market value: First, in the cases of cross-border 
transfer of assets, where head office transfers assets to its PE or vice versa. 
Secondly, cases where two PEs transfer assets between themselves. And lastly, 
the previously mentioned transfer of tax residency from state A to state B 
(Navarro, 2016, p. 118). In addition to these rules, paragraphs 2-7 of the Art. 5 
of the ATAD lay down specific rules in relation to recovery of transfers within 
the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA) (Council Directive laying down 
rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the 
internal market, 2016). 
 
In addition to the specification of the cases where the tax payers would be 
subject to exit taxation, the Commission highlights the importance of fixation of 
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the market value of the transaction that took place, and its compliance with the 
arm’s length principle (Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance 
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 2016). The 
differences in valuation and cross-border transactions, can give rise to certain 
issues inherent to them. One of them is the issue of judicial double taxation. 
Nevertheless, in intra-EU transaction this issue has been mitigated by the 
obligation imposed over Member States, to accept the market values 
established by other Member States (Navarro, 2016, p. 120). 
 
The preamble of the directive instructs the Member States to inter alia, that 
they could for instance require companies to include all necessary information 
in the declaration upon exiting. However, it is specifically stated that the exit 
tax should not be charged when the transfer of assets is temporary in nature, 
and the transfer is concluded in order to fulfil certain requirements (Directive 
2016/1164). Hence it is important to keep in mind the nature of the provision 
as it bears title of directive and Member States still remain free to transpose it 
in their national legislation. 
 
5.4.3 General anti-abuse rule 
 
The general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) seems to act as a ‘catch-all’ or a ‘gap filling’ 
provision. This anti-abuse rule is designed to apply to arrangements which are 
‘not genuine’. This thus allows the taxpayer to choose the most tax efficient 
structure for its commercial affairs. The wording of the Article itself is fairly 
vague and the nature of the Article seems to follow similar conditions that were 
established by the CJEU in Cadbury Schweppes; (Directive 2016/1164, Article 
123) “a Member State shall ignore an arrangement or a series of arrangements 
which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main 
purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the 
applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and 
circumstances…” (Directive 2016/1164 Article 6 para 1). 
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The Commission’s Staff working document describes the ‘Action 6’ of the OECD 
to be direct counter measure to Treaty shopping and other forms of Treaty 
abuse strategies, which are used by the tax payers in order to obtain benefits 
from the provisions Treaties that were not intended to be granted (COM (2016) 
2016 final). The GAAR does not in its wording directly address Treaty shopping 
or conduct such as artificial avoidance of PE status. Nevertheless, it seems that 
wording of Article 6 requires to address such conduct on a national level 
(Directive 2016/1164., Art. 6 para 1). 
 
5.4.4 Hybrid mismatches 
 
Hybrid mismatches play a significant role in tax avoiding arrangements. Hybrid 
instruments can for instance be something between equity and liability, such 
instruments can become an issue in the situations of so-called ‘qualification 
conflicts’ (Helminen, 2013, p. 315); in some cases, it has proven to be 
particularly difficult for two different states to categorize certain instruments. 
This can potentially lead to situations where State A treats a particular 
instrument as equity, where earnings generated by it are treated as dividends. 
State B in turn may treat the same instrument as liability, and therefore its 
profits as interest. Such arrangements can therefore lead into double taxation 
or zero taxation. Another mismatch that can potentially occur is the 
classification of an entity situated in another tax jurisdiction. The preamble of 
the ATAD recognizes the issues in relation to PEs (Council Directive laying down 
rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the 
internal market, 2016). 
 
Tax jurisdictions may face difficulties in relation to categorization of certain 
operation in either in its own or foreign jurisdiction. The point where a foreign 
representation in state B of a company situated in state A may be difficult, and 
has to do with what kind of operations the foreign representation or agency is 
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conducting, e.g. is the representation merely taking orders from clients and 
forwarding them to the parent located in state A or actually doing something to 
fulfill these orders. The tax treatment of PEs and subsidiaries can vary 
significantly and in some cases the differing classifications can lead to double 
deductions and tax payers might seek to benefit from these conflicts. 
 
Corporations may take an advantage of these ‘hybrid instruments or entities’ to 
minimize taxation (Helminen, 2013, p. 315). The legislation on hybrid 
mismatches is necessary due to the inherent problem that lies within them.  
According to Navarra, Parada and Schwarz the Article applies as long as there is 
a different characterization to the same entity or instrument, and that the 
characterization causes either double deduction or a deduction/non-inclusion 
(Navarro, 2016, pp. 127-128). If there is a hybrid mismatch that results in 
double deduction, the deduction can only be given in the Member State where 
the payment has its source (Council Directive laying down rules against tax 
avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 
2016, p. Art. 9(1)). 
 
The ATAD stipulates that in the first and the second paragraphs that “To the 
extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a double deduction, the deduction shall 
be given only in the Member State where such payment has its source”, and 
that “To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a deduction without 
inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall deny the deduction of such 
payment.” (Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices 
that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 2016, p. Art. 9(1)(2)). 
Even in the existence of guidelines on hybrid mismatches on OECD BEPS Action 
2, the Commission found the need to include these two paragraphs in the 
ATAD. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
Corporate tax avoidance can definitely be seen as reason for loss of income for 
several States within the European Union. Due to the great variety of tax 
avoidance schemes it is very difficult to regulate and forbid these. If a State 
would wish to regulate tax avoidance and make it for example illegal it would 
require the State to enter into multilateral agreements with other States to be 
able to make them work.  
 
Furthermore, when it comes to the context of the European Union and its 
competence to regulate in the field of tax avoidance and more precisely direct 
taxation one can clearly see the difficulty the EU faces. Since direct taxes in 
general belongs to the States competence as long as it complies with the EU 
laws and regulations, the EU has very limited possibilities to regulate. 
 
In the authors opinion tax avoidance is a matter that falls under the corporate 
social responsibility for multinational enterprises and should not be regulated on 
an EU level since it is very difficult and costly. The author believes that 
corporate social responsibility is a matter of increasing importance among 
customers and the society and therefore it is in the great interest of 
corporations to respect this and follow the expectations by the society.  
  
  
 
33 
7 Bibliography 
 
Avi-Yonah, R. S., 2004. Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax. Virginia Law Review, 90(5). 
 
Barnard, C., 2013. The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms. 4th Edition ed. 
Oxford. 
 
Blouin, L. N. H., 2014. Thin Capitalization Rules and Multinational Firm Capital 
Structure. European Commission. 
 
Camille Allain, J. F. A.-G. M., 2016, Facing tax fraud in the European Union - 
Challenges and perspectives. Themis competition. 
 
Cerioni, L., 2015. The European Union and Direct Taxation: A Solution for a Difficult 
Relationship. Routledge. 
 
Chen, The Rebirth of CCCTB: Lessons from US Multistate Tax Compact, Kluwer 
International Tax Blog, June 30, 2015. Available at: 
http://kluwertaxblog.com/2015/06/30/the-rebirth-of-ccctb-lessons-from-us-multistate-
tax-compact/ [Accessed 13.03.2017] 
 
COM(2016) 683 final, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), European Commission. 
 
COM (2016) 685 final Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on a Common Corporate Tax 
Base, European Commission. 
 
COM(2015) 302 final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 
Key Areas for Action, European Commission. 
 
Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164. of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax 
avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market  
 
Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 2011/16/EU 
as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation. 
 
Council Directive (EU) 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of 
taxation. 
 
Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the 
field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC. 
 
Council Directive 2003/49/EC on a common system of taxation applicable to interest 
and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member 
States. 
 
DG Competition Working paper on State Aid and Tax Rulings, 3 June 2016. Available 
at: 
  
 
34 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/working_paper_tax_rulings.pdf 
[Accessed 10.02.2017] 
 
European Commission., 2001. Green Paper. Promoting a European Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Brussels, European Commission. 
 
European Commission, 2011. A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Brussels, European Commission. 
 
European Commission, 2013. State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax benefits to Apple worth 
up to €13 billion, Brussels, European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923 
 
European Commission, 2016. Commission proposes major corporate tax reform for the 
EU, Strasbourg 
 
European Commission, 2016. Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against 
tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, 
Brussels 
 
European Commission, 2017. Enhanced administrative cooperation in the field of 
(direct) taxation. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/tax-
cooperation-control/administrative-cooperation/enhanced-administrative-cooperation-
field-direct-taxation_en. [Accessed 11.04.2017] 
 
European Commission, Press release IP/16/3471, Commission proposes major 
corporate tax reform for the EU, Strasbourg, 25 October 2016 
 
European Court of Justice, 2005. C-196/04, Cadbury’s Schweppes v. Commissioners of 
the Inland Revenue . 
 
European Court of Justice, 2003, C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor 
Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd.  
 
European Court of Justice, 1999. C-212/97, Centros v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen. 
 
European Court of Justice, 1988, C-81/87 The Queen v H. M. Treasury and 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc.  
 
European Commission Press release IP/16/3471, Commission proposes major 
corporate tax reform for the EU, Strasbourg, 25 October 2016 
 
European Court of Justice, 1986. C-79/85 D. H. M. Segers v Bestuur van de 
Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en Verze-keringswezen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen.  
 
Garbarino, C., 2016. Harmonization and Coordination of Corporate Taxes in the 
European Union. EC Tax Review. 
 
Gravelle, J. G., 2010. Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, s.l.: 
DIANE Publishing. 
 
  
 
35 
Heitzman, M. H. &. S., 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics. 
 
Helminen, M., 2011. EU Tax Law: Direct Taxation. Amsterdam, IBFD. 
 
Helminen, M., 2013. Kansainvälinen tuloverotus. Edita. 
 
Jones, J. F. A., 2003. Conflicts of Qualification: Comment on Prof. Vogel’s and 
Alexander Rust’s Articles. Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, May. 
 
Navarro, P. &. S., 2016. The Proposal for an EU Anti-Avoidance Directive: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts. EC Tax Review, 25(3). 
 
OECD, 2015. Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2014. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
 
OECD, 2015. Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances, Action 6 - 2015 Final Report. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
 
OECD, 2015. Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 3: Strengthening CFC Rules, s.l.: 
OECD. 
 
OECD, 2012. Thin Capitalization Legislation: A Background Paper for Country Tax 
Administrations, s.l.: OECD Tax & Development. 
 
OECD, 2010, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2010, OECD Publishing, Paris.  
 
OECD, 2010. Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. Available 
online: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/ENG-Amended-
Convention.pdf [Accessed 01.02.2017]. 
 
Osbourne, D. A., 2011. Deterring Transfer Pricing Abuse: Changing Incentives as a 
Practical Alternative to Global Tax Regime. Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review, 10(4). 
 
Os, v., 2016. The Interest Limitation under the Adopted Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
and Proportionality. EC Tax Review, Volume 25. 
 
P. Craig, G. d. B., 2015. EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials. 6th Edition ed. Oxford. 
 
Panayi, C. H., 2010. Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics. In: 
Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the European Union. Amsterdam: IBFD. 
 
Panjay, C. H., 2013. European Union Corporate Tax Law. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Panjay, C. H., 2015. Is Aggressive Tax Planning Socially Irresponsible?. Intertax. 
 
Paternoster, D., 2016. General Tax Policy, European Parliament. 
 
  
 
36 
R. Palan, R. M. &. C. C., 2010. Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works. New York: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Remeur, C., 2015. Tax Policy in the EU: Issues and challenges. s.l.:European 
Parliamentary Research Service. 
 
Ryding, Ravenscroft, European Commission's CCCTB proposal 'will not fix the problem 
of transfer pricing and corporate tax dodging', European Network on Debt and 
Development, 25 Oct 2016 Available at: 
http://www.eurodad.org/Entries/view/1546657/2016/10/25/European-Commission-s-
CCCTB-proposal-will-not-fix-the-problem-of-transfer-pricing-and-corporate-tax-dodging 
[Accessed 03.03.2017]. 
 
Sandler, D., 1998. Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation: Pushing 
the Boundaries. 2nd Edition ed. Kluwer Law International. 
 
Schippers, 2016. BEPS and Transfer Pricing but What about VAT and Customs?. EC Tax 
Review , Volume 25. 
 
Schwanke, A., 2016. UK expedites EU corporate tax race to the bottom. International 
Tax Review, 23 August. 
 
Sikka, P., 2010. Smoke and mirrors: Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance. 
Accounting Forum, Volume 34. 
 
United Nations, 2011. Informal Meeting on Practical Transfer Pricing Issues for 
Developing Countries.  
Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2011_TP/TP_Chapter1_Introduction.pdf 
[Accessed 13.03.2017] 
 
Wisselink, M., 1979. Concept of international tax avoidance. In: International Tax 
Avoidance. s.l.:Kluwer Law International. 
 
Vonwil, M. &. W. R., 2009. The CSR myth: true beauty comes from within. In: J. K. &. 
R. Wreschniok, ed. Reputation Capital: Building and Maintaining Trust in the 21st 
Century. New York: Springer. 
 
Zucman, G., 2014. Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate 
Profits. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4). 
 
